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Executive Summary 
 The EU Referendum was held on 23rd June 2016.  This research report evaluates the 
quality of electoral administration and management using a survey and qualitative 
interviews with the electoral officials involved in manging it.  
 The overall picture is that given the high profile nature of the referendum, the Chief 
Counting Officer (CCO), the Electoral Commission and electoral officials across the UK 
manged the referendum very well:   
o The management structures, first used for a UK wide referendum in 2011, seemed 
to have been improved suggesting some learning from past experiences and 
‘bedding in’ of new processes.  However, there are still concerns amongst some 
Counting Officers that the directions were over-prescriptive. 
o The Count went overwhelmingly smoothly in large part because of planned 
rehearsals. 
o The guidance and resources produced by the CCO were highly valued by electoral 
officials. 
o There were very few suspected cases of electoral fraud, although pressures from 
campaigners that pens should be used caused some disruption in some polling 
stations. 
 However, there were aspects of the underlying electoral machinery which caused 
problems that manifested themselves during the referendum period.  Although these are 
beyond the direct remit of the CCO and the Electoral Commission, it could support 
reforms and promote debate around these issues given the Commission’s statutory duty 
to keep under review the legal framework governing elections in the UK:   
o The legal structure for the referendum was clear.  The statutory timetable for the 
referendum was tight, however; and the late legislation to extend the registration 
deadline because of the crash of the central government registration website 
placed a major burden on many electoral officials.  A common theme throughout 
the research was concerns about workplace pressure, stress and staffing.  This is 
especially the case when electoral events follow each other in quick succession.  
o Many members of the public reported confusion about the electoral registration 
process and a large number of duplicate applications which absorbed resources.   
o Alarmingly, concerns about levels of funding were raised with nearly half of local 
authorities claiming that they have insufficient funds to maintain the electoral 
register.   
o There are some challenging business processes involved in postal voting and 
overseas voting which also place a strain on local authorities.  Some overseas 
citizens may not have not been able to cast their votes or have them counted 
because of the tight timescales involved with registration and posting ballot 
papers through the international mail system.  There were also concerns that the 
proxy voting process was open to vulnerabilities. 
o There were relatively few problems or incidents on the day of the poll.  There 
were virtually no problems with electoral fraud and very limited cases of voter 
intimidation, despite high profile concerns in advance of the referendum.  There 
was, however, evidence of citizens not being able to vote and turned away 
because they were unregistered.   
o Electoral officials often reported a low level of understanding of the electoral 
procedures amongst some campaigners who were new to the electoral process.   
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o A system for reporting electoral fraud seems to have been established with 
electoral officials very clear how to report suspected cases and finding their SPoC 
accessible and responsive.   
 Potential reforms are set out in the conclusions. 
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Introduction 
1. On the 23rd June 2016 a referendum took place on whether the UK should remain or leave 
the European Union. This was a hugely significant electoral event that would have a major 
impact on British politics and public policy.  It gathered coverage from the media across the 
world.  The electoral machinery was therefore under intense public scrutiny. 
2. The Electoral Commission has specific responsibilities and functions in relation to the 
delivery and regulation of referendums held under the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000.  The European Union Referendum Act, received Royal Assent on 17 
December 2015, made additions and amendments to the framework set out in PPERA and 
thereby provided a framework for the Commission’s role in the referendum.   
3. Under this legislation the Chair of the Electoral Commission, or someone they appoint, must 
act as the Chief Counting Officer (CCO) for the referendum and is responsible for certifying 
the outcome of the referendum.  The CCO was also responsible for appointing Regional 
Counting Officers (RCOs) for each electoral region.   The 11 RCOs are responsible for ‘co-
ordinating the planning and administration across their electoral region and for managing 
the collation of the local to totals into a total for the electoral region, which will be fed into 
the UK wide result’.2  382 Counting Officers (COs) were responsible for the voting process in 
their local government or electoral area.  In each case, the CO was the Returning Officer for 
the local authority.  In Northern Ireland, the Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland 
(CEONI) was the CO for the whole of Northern Ireland.3   
4. The CCO had power to give directions to RCOs and COs under Schedule 3 of the European 
Union Referendum Act 2015.  These directions could involve: 
 
(a) directions about the discharge of their functions; 
(b) directions requiring them to take specified steps in preparation for the referendum; 
(c) directions requiring them to provide the Chief Counting Officer with information that 
they have or are entitled to have.
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5. Although the Electoral Commission had these powers, the referendum was otherwise run in 
accordance with the system of Britain’s electoral laws set by Parliament and the electoral 
register used for Parliamentary elections, which is maintained by electoral registration 
officers in local authorities (or, in some cases in Scotland, in Valuation Joint  boards (VJBs) ). 
6. The Electoral Commission therefore had a role both running the referendum, regulating 
campaign organisations, and also reporting on the quality of administration at the 
referendum.  This project was therefore commissioned to provide an independent 
evaluation of the administration of the referendum and the role of Electoral Commission.  
An online survey and qualitative interviews were undertaken with electoral officials who ran 
the referendum. 
7. The first section outlines the methodology.  The following section reports the findings with 
respect to each different aspect of the referendum.  The final section provides a summary 
and makes recommendations. 
                                                          
2
 http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/196248/EU-Ref-Part-A-Role-and-
responsibilities.pdf, p. 8 
3
 https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/209419/Briefing-European-Union-
Referendum-Management-2016-06-14.pdf Gibraltar was a separate electoral area for the purposes of the 
referendum and overseen by the South West RCO. 
4
 Para 7(5) Schedule 3 European Union Referendum Act 2015  
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Methodology  
8. The survey was sent electronically to the 380 local authorities administering the referendum 
throughout Great Britain. It was also sent to the electoral authorities in Gibraltar and to the 
Electoral Office of Northern Ireland (EONI). Of these potential 382 local and electoral 
authorities, responses were received from 254 giving a 66% response rate for the counting 
officer survey. This is an excellent response rate for this type of survey, which considerably 
exceeded expectations. A little caution is required in interpreting this figure. Some local 
authorities had two separate members of staff complete the survey, and have therefore 
made duplicate submissions, while in five cases, the response was flagged as covering more 
than one local authority.5  The view of the researchers is that these duplicate/multiple 
responses largely cancel each other out and that, for the purposes of this report, the figures 
below can be taken as reliable. Responses were made by Counting Officers (82), Electoral 
Registration Officers (30), Electoral Service Managers (ESMs) (162) and Electoral 
Administrators (31). Nine hard copy responses were received and added to the dataset 
manually. These are included in the response rates above. All figures in tables are rounded 
and consequently may not sum to 100.   
9. There was an extensive amount of qualitative replies provided in accompaniment to the 
quantitative replies in the survey which provide a rich source of information about the 
problems faced by COs.  These mostly explained the nature of problems experienced.   
10. 25 semi-structured interviews took place (1 CCO & DCCO, all 11 RCOs and the Chief Electoral 
Officer for Northern Ireland (CEONI), and a further 12 COs) mostly over the telephone.6 The 
aim of the interviews was to allow electoral officials to flag important challenges which were 
not anticipated by the survey. 
Legislative framework 
11. The European Union Referendum Act, received Royal Assent on 17 December 2015 and 
came into force on 1 February 2016.7  This Act, in combination with existing legislation, 
provided the regulatory framework for the referendum.  On the 23 February 2016, the 
Government laid The European Union Referendum (Date of Referendum, etc.) Regulations 
2016 before Parliament.  This set the date of the referendum as 23 June 2016.8 As Table 1 
illustrates, most respondents to the survey were generally satisifed that the legislative 
framework for the referendum was set out sufficiently long in advance and that it set out 
the duties of each electoral official clearly.  The Commission published a timetable 
containing the statutory deadlines for the referendum.9 There were some concerns that the 
timetable was was too tight, with 28 per cent of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing 
that it was too tight.   
                                                          
5
 Eight local authorities completed two questionnaires, while five responses were made which covered 
multiple councils involving eleven councils in total.  
6
 Two interviews were conducted face to face: a joint interview with the CCO and DCCO; and another with one 
RCO.   
7
 http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-
elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum 
8
 http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7486/CBP-7486.pdf  
9
 http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/file/0004/198229/EU-Referendum-timetable-23-
June-Final.doc  
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12. The government introduced late legislation to extend the registration deadline from 7 June 
by 48 hours to midnight on the 9 June.  This followed the high-profile crash of the voter 
registration website run by the Cabinet Office (www.gov.uk/register-to-vote).   
13. The survey suggests that most respondents thought that the applications received were 
from individuals already registered at their address (duplicates).  Data from the Electoral 
Management Software suggested that 427,045 applications were received between 
midnight on the 7 June and up to midnight on the 9 June. Of these applications 
approximately 46 per cent are thought to have been duplicate.10 77 per cent of respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed that the extension of the registration deadline caused challenges 
disproportionate to the number of electors registered as a result.   
 
Table 1: Legislative Framework (%) 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
agree 
 
N 
The statutory timetable for the 
referendum was too tight 
4 34 34 23 5 
 
254 
The overall timing of the 
referendum did not cause any 
significant difficulties 
26 45 12 17 1 
 
254 
The legislative framework for the 
referendum was set in sufficient 
time ahead of the poll 
4 24 19 52 2 
 
254 
The legislative framework clearly 
set out my responsibilities  
- 3 14 77 6 
 
252 
The extension of the registration 
deadline caused challenges 
disproportionate to the number of 
electors registered as a result 
3 8 12 36 41 
 
253 
The extension of the registration 
deadline had a significant impact 
on our ability to deliver the 
referendum 
5 31 21 29 15 
 
254 
  
14. Qualitative evidence suggested that the extention of the electoral registration deadline had 
a major effect on electoral officials. Local authorities were unable to employ and train 
additional staff at such short notice so it simply meant that many people worked longer 
hours.  This added to stress levels and some respondents reported significant degrees of 
exhaustion since the referendum had closely followed elections in May, and many staff had 
not taken holidays.  To quote two separate respondents:  
 
                                                          
10
 Correspondence with the Electoral Commission based on data provided by 344 local authorities. 
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‘There was just no let up in the work load and it just got progressively more and more. It's 
no wonder so many people went off with stress related issues’. 
 
‘As ever we just got on and did it, however this placed additional stress on the key staff 
who were exhausted from implementing the second major electoral event in a six week 
period.’ 
 
15. The extention of the deadline also had a knock-on of squeezing the time available to prepare 
for polling day.  This increased the chances of errors being made and in some cases led to 
compromises being made such as there being insufficient time to send polling cards to the 
late registrants: 
‘Not all late applicants received poll cards despite them being sent 1st class on Monday 
20th June as it was simply too close to the date of the poll. We were unable to carry out 
all the checks we would normally carry out on polling station registers to ensure that they 
were both complete and accurate as we were unable to print them until the afternoon of 
Monday 20th June due to a software issue caused by the deadline extension and they had 
to in the boxes ready for collection the following day. This added a significant risk to the 
process that could have been mitigated by not altering the determination deadline for the 
Referendum.’ 
‘The extension of the registration deadline meant a delay in the printing of the registers 
for use in polling stations - meaning they were being printed on the day presiding officers 
were turning up to collect their ballot boxes and sundries - this increased the potential for 
mistakes and added to the stress of the team.’ 
‘The extension in determination date by 48 hours caused software system errors, noticed 
when undertaking the rigorous checks on my polling station registers the Saturday before 
polling day. The registers had to be reprinted on the Monday out of hours once a 'fix' had 
been received, but this undermined confidence and was very stressful.’ 
16. Table 1 illustrates that 44 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the 
extention affected their ability to deliver the referendum.   At least half of teams coped with 
the deadline with few problems.  Although the outcome of the referendum was clear cut, 
these compromises could have had a profound effect on the delivery of the referendum and 
potentially, therefore, the legitimacy of the outcome in a closer contest.  
Registration  
17. The electoral register used for the referendum was the Parliamentary electoral register, 
which is maintained by electoral registration officers in local authorities and Scottish 
valuation joint boards. This is produced in accordance with the law made in Parliament.  The 
Electoral Commission therefore did not therefore have a direct jurisdiction over this area for 
the referendum.  Respondents reported a number of challenges in compiling the electoral 
register for the referendum, however.  These were challenges involved in the regular 
running of electoral registration, but which were acute in the run up to polling day for the 
referendum. 
18. Respondents said that public confusion about their registration status and duplicate 
registrations were the most extensive challenges that they faced (Table 2).  These problems 
were clearly linked.  Many interviewees pointed to citizens thinking that they needed to re-
register, unnecessarily re-registering and thereby adding to the workload of electoral 
officials. 
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19. A very common theme of the interviews was criticism about the public message about 
registration.  Many officials suggested it could have been made clearer that re-registration 
was not necessary.  One suggested that: 
‘The Electoral Commission’s stance of not trying to over complicate the registration 
message to the public caused us considerable problems. The volume of duplicate 
registrations was extremely high and accounted for approximately 45% of the 
applications we had to process. These registrations not only took considerable time and 
resources to work through but also confused the public too.’ 
Table 2: Registration (%) 
 No challenge 
whatsoever 
0 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
Extensive 
Challenges 
 
5 
N 
Election 
management 
software (EMS) 
15 34 20 20 10 1 248 
Levels of duplicate 
applications for 
registration 
2 4 7 20 32 37 244 
Proximity of May 
elections to the 
referendum 
2 2 11 20 30 35 249 
Confusion from the 
public about their 
registration status  
2 - 7 16 32 44 248 
Requirement to 
provide date of 
birth and National 
Insurance Number 
(exception/attestat
ion process)  
10 22 27 22 15 4 245 
Insufficient staff  9 24 26 19 15 8 247 
Insufficiently 
experienced staff 
15 26 22 16 12 10 246 
 
20. Serious challenges were expressed in terms of staffing in some areas.  8 per cent of local 
authorities faced extensive challenges with staffing levels and 10 per cent faced extensive 
problems with insufficiently experienced staff.  Causes of staffing problems included the 
timing of the referendum since it came shortly after the May elections and coincided with 
Ramadan which will have affected some areas more than others.  However, cutbacks were 
also cited.  Although this was not a problem across the board it could leave authorities 
exposed: 
‘The Election Manager left in January, recruitment was successful, but new ESM was 
unable to start until mid-April due to required resignation period.  Senior ESA, who 
stepped up in the absence of the ESM, went of sick with stress induced illness in March 
and has been unable to return to work.  Another team member also went off sick with 
stress related health problems in May and has still not returned to work.  Although Admin 
assistance was made available, there were no AEA consultants available and therefore the 
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remaining staff have had to deal with an unprecedented volume of work, with fewer 
experienced staff.’   
21. Some respondents suggested that they were still recovering from the introduction of 
individual electoral registration, which had meant a major change of business processes. 
22. Problems with the Electoral Management Software included late software fixes and poor 
advice from the supplier.  
23. There was also problems experienced with individuals missing from the electoral register 
who thought that they were registered (see ‘polling day’). 
24. Higher volume registrations from overseas voters was flagged by COs as costing 
considerable staff time.   The requirement to verify the 15 year residency address for 
overseas voters was very time consuming because the nature of voter registration records 
15 years ago was primarily a manual process. Overseas registrations therefore took much 
more time than domestic registrations. This led to concerns being expressed about the 
proposal to extend overseas voter rights and what this would take administratively.   
Management structure  
25. The management structure at the referendum outlined in the introduction is still relatively 
new because the Electoral Commission was only established in 2000 and UK wide 
referendums remain relatively rare.  The only prior UK wide referendum with the Electoral 
Commission in its current role was the 2011 AV referendum. 
Table 3: Management structure (%) 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
N 
The overall management structure 
for the referendum worked well 
- 3 15 74 8 
254 
The overall management structure 
for the referendum worked better 
than it does for an election 
3 27 60 9 1 
254 
The CCO’s planning for the 
referendum was effective  
1 5 20 66 9 
254 
The RCO’s planning for the 
referendum was effective  
- 2 12 67 19 
251 
Rehearsals of the result collation 
process were useful in helping iron 
out potential difficulties   
2 10 8 63 18 
253 
 
26. The survey revealed high levels of overall satisfaction among COs with the management 
structure with 82 per cent agreeing or strongly agreeing that it ‘worked well’.  A vast 
majority also agreed or strongly agreed that the CCO’s and their RCO’s planning was 
effective. 
27. Interviews with RCOs also suggested that they thought that the structures worked well and 
seemed to have been successfully adapted from the models used in 2011.  They thought 
that the Chief Counting Officer had made many efforts to reach out and speak to COs and 
local and regional events and that ‘it had been noticed’ in the electoral community.  RCOs 
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described themselves as being well-supported and drew most of their support from their 
local teams.  In some cases this was strengthened with new, short-term appointments. 
28. The vast majority of COs responded in the survey (86%) that RCO’s planning for the 
referendum had been effective.  RCOs were widely described as supportive.  As one put it: 
‘We were very impressed with the [RCO] team. The RCO was a great asset to the team and 
always there to offer advice and support, no matter how small the issue was.’  The few 
concerns that were held related to whether the RCO was unnecessary since the CO already 
had sufficient expertise already or the RCO was slow with the collating of count information 
on the night.   
29. Although feedback about the formal management structures were generally positive, many 
officials during interviews RCOs and COs were keen to stress that informal networks and 
relationships were more important than the formal structures in providing support. COs also 
pointed to the importance of peers in other local authorities. ‘Structures are fine, but 
relationships are everything,’ said one.  
30. Legislation designates the Chair of the Electoral Commission as the Chief Counting Officer for 
referendums, or gives them the power to appoint someone.  RCOs were asked whether this 
law was fit for purpose.  Most agreed that it was, suggesting that the Chair of the Electoral 
Commission had the knowledge and overview to manage the process.  The position was 
described as carrying the necessary ‘kudos and integrity’ needed. One respondent asked 'if 
not [the Commission Chair], then who?’  
31. There were some reservations that a conflict of interest may exist because the Commission 
was both the regulator and manager of the referendum process.  It was also pointed out 
that few in the Electoral Commission have direct experience of ‘working on the coalface of 
elections’ and that this was vitally important.  Greater use of regional representatives from 
the Commission ‘who are closer to the coal face’ was described as one way of remedying 
this. 
32. RCOs explained that the management structure allowed them to provide advice, support 
and a problem solving system to COs.  In addition it provided them with a framework to 
identify ‘at risk’ COs (for example, because of staff changes) and take action to ensure 
compliance and consistency in the delivery of the referendum.  Although informal regional 
support and advice networks often exist for elections, this was not universally in place.  
33. The management structure, although fit for purpose for referendums, was not thought to be 
an improvement on that used for elections by most counting officers, however. Only 10 per 
cent of COs thought that the structure used was better than that used for elections, but 
most at 60 per cent neither agreed nor disagreed. Respondents stressed the differences 
between the referendums and elections, most notably the complexity of the ballot structure 
in normal elections which means that there is greater local variation in the challenges faced 
in those contests.  
The CCO’s Use of Directions 
34. A key component of the management structure was the CCO’s ability to issue directions to 
RCOs and COs.  The survey demonstrates that the directions were very widely thought to be 
clear, easy to understand and issued in sufficient time to allow preparation and made it 
easier to plan and run the referendum.  Roughly half of respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed that the directions focused on the most important issues for ensuring public 
confidence in the result.  68 per cent indicated that it was either fairly or very easy to follow 
the directions. 
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35. The directions had the positive effects of bringing a consistent experience for the voter (72 
per cent agreed or strongly agreed) making it easier for many electoral officials to plan and 
implement the referendum (57 per cent agreed or strongly agreed), and, to  a lesser extent, 
prevented errors being made (37 per cent agreed or strongly agreed) (Table 4). 
36. However, the negative effects included increased financial costs (43 per cent either agreed 
or strongly agreed), absorbing staff time (38 per cent either agreed or strongly agreed) and 
overriding local experience (24 per cent either agreed or strongly agreed) (Table 4).  
Qualitative interviews suggested that many COs felt that the Electoral Commission is over 
directive and that the directions given ‘are self-evident and just good practice’.  As some put 
it: 
 
‘The directions covered the key areas but did not allow for local knowledge, teams 
experience of running elections or give flexibility when local issues arose.’ 
‘Pressure for early despatch of postal votes meant extra staffing and issue sessions to be 
organised’ 
37. Rarely did the directions introduce new ways of working (10 per cent either agreed or 
strongly agreed) or negatively affect staff enjoyment of their roles (8 per cent either agreed 
or strongly agreed).   
 
Table 4: Working with the CCO (%) 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
N 
The CCO’s directions were clear and easy 
to understand 
- 2 7 74 17 
254 
The CCO’s directions were issued in 
sufficient time to allow me to prepare 
effectively for the referendum  
- 4 9 71 17 
253 
The directions from the CCO made it easier 
to plan and run the referendum 
1 7 35 49 8 
253 
The directions from the CCO helped to 
ensure a consistent experience for voters 
across local authorities  
- 2 25 62 10 
 
253 
The directions from the CCO helped to 
prevent errors being made 
2.0 18 44 33 4 
254 
The directions focused on the issues most 
important for achieving public confidence 
in the result 
- 7 44 44 5 
 
252 
The directions from the CCO involved 
more financial costs 
2 15 40 35 8 
253 
The directions from the CCO absorbed 
staff time 
2 24 35 33 5 
252 
The directions from the CCO overrode 
local experience and needs 
4 33 39 20 4 
253 
I had sufficient opportunity to input during 
the development of the directions. 
4 22 40 32 2 
254 
The directions from the CCO introduced 
new ways of working or ideas we haven’t 
thought of before 
14 45 31 9 1 
251 
The directions from the CCO made me 
enjoy my job less 
15 35 42 6 2 
253 
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38. There was some criticism about the need to provide information about turnout levels at 
polling stations.  The requirement to send out postal votes early was also criticised (see 
‘absent voting’). 
39. RCOs overwhelming felt that they had the opportunity to provide input into the directions.  
RCOs suggested that there was broad agreement on them.  There was less consensus on the 
need for an overnight count and whether there were sufficient checks for data entry errors 
in the count collation process. COs felt less involved in devising the standards. 
40. Directions are therefore not accepted uncritically and don’t add value in every circumstance.  
They clearly have many positive effects, however.  Many qualitative replies suggested that 
the CCO got the balance better than in 2011 and that the practice of having directions is now 
more embedded.11  As one put it: 
‘We strongly disagreed with the onerous directions imposed by the CCO on the last 
referendum. The directions used this time were proportional, well written and the CCO 
should be commended.’  
Guidance and resources 
41. The CCO and the Electoral Commission produced resources and guidance to help COs 
promote voter engagement, and plan the poll and count (as with other electoral events). 
The Commission also provides support by answering calls from electoral officials. 
42. The most important finding is that overall levels of satisfaction with the support from the 
CCO and the Electoral Commission were high (figure 1). 
Figure 1: Satisfaction with Electoral Commission Support (%) 
 
                                                          
11
 On the experience of 2011, see: Toby S. James (2016) ‘The Effects of Centralising Electoral Management 
Board Design’, Policy Studies, published online 26
th
 July 2016. 
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43. Respondents were clear that the CCO and Electoral Commission provided resources that 
were widely used and very useful (Table 5 and 6). The Electoral Commission provides clear 
economies of scale in the production of resources of this kind which benefits electoral 
officials at the local level. 
44. The most common criticism of the Electoral Commission from COs was that some of the 
materials would have been more useful if they had been produced earlier:  
 
‘Timely guidance needs to be available (not 'under construction' at a time when 
administrators are needing to make decisions)’  
 
‘Timing needs to be much better. There was too much too late. Much of the prep had 
been done throughout the Scottish Parliamentary Election and had all to be re-reviewed 
once the Electoral Commission’s Referendum guidance had been issued. This caused 
delay and duplication of effort.’ 
 
Table 5: Guidance & resources (%) 
 
Not 
aware 
of 
Did 
not 
use 
Not 
useful 
at all 
1 
2 3 4 
V. 
useful 
5 
N 
Counting Officer Expenses Guidance  1 4 1 4 23 41 27 253 
Template Project Plan  - 13 4 12 28 26 17 254 
Template Risk Register - 9 4 10 29 32 16 254 
FAQs for front-line staff  2 12 3 8 25 36 14 252 
Polling station handbook  - - - - 8 33 58 252 
Polling station quick guide  - 2 1 2 9 31 55 253 
Polling station staff training  - 11 3 13 26 27 20 250 
Verification and count toolkit  - 19 4 11 20 29 17 253 
Doubtful ballot paper guidance  - 1 1 2 8 39 49 252 
Timetable for the EU referendum  - 2 1 2 12 35 48 252 
Guidance for Counting Officers  - 1 1 2 16 40 41 253 
Direct advice or guidance from the 
Electoral Commission (by phone or 
email)  
2 17 5 8 18 28 21 
253 
 
Table 6: Guidance & Resources 2 (%) 
 Not 
aware 
of 
Did not 
use 
1 2 3 4 5 
N 
EU Referendum partner 
guide 
9 35 2 11 24 16 4 248 
Posters 1 33 3 12 26 19 6 251 
Infographics 7 37 3 9 22 16 6 249 
Email signature 10 52 3 7 13 12 3 248 
Website button  7 48 2 8 14 17 4 243 
Facebook cover image 7 47 4 7 19 12 5 247 
Twitter header image  5 42 4 7 21 17 5 248 
Template press releases  1 18 2 11 28 28 12 251 
Template social media 
posts  
2 15 3 10 26 30 15 251 
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45. Some COs said that it would have been useful if the Electoral Commission had had an out-of-
hours contact telephone number on the day of the poll and night of the count. That such a 
number existed suggests that more work may be needed to publicise such support 
mechanisms during future elections and referendums.   A few COs pointed to slow replies 
from the Commission or that it’s staff lacked the experience of ‘the day-to-day admin of 
electoral registration.’    
46. Yet, there were also many qualitative comments in praise of the Commission, suggesting 
that it had found an established role in the electoral community: 
‘For a first time electoral administrator, I found the resources thorough, logical and very 
useful. The way they are laid out on the website is also helpful.’ 
‘I always find the EC guidance and resources excellent and they form part of my planning. 
The wait for some resources, such as the polling station staff training PowerPoint, was a 
little frustrating. However, I appreciate the commission was operating under the same 
time constraints as local authorities. Any queries I had directly were in the most part 
answered promptly.’ 
‘I think the Commission provide a vital role in ensuring that elections are run well and 
professionally.  Their importance is increased when local government cuts are having an 
impact upon the ability to run elections well.  Access to high quality guidance and 
materials/resources provided by the Commission is now an integral and important part of 
the whole process; it is a partnership between the Commission and local government 
which works very well. 
Funding 
47. The system for distributing funding for the running of the referendum was generally thought 
to be efficient with less than 10 per cent expressing concerns (Table 7).   
Table 7: Funding (%) 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
N 
There is an efficient 
process for distributing 
referendum funds to 
administrators 
- 9 27 61 3 253 
Sufficient funds were 
provided through the fees 
and charges process to run 
the referendum 
4 15 38 40 3 252 
There is sufficient funding 
available to support the 
work required to compile 
the electoral register 
15 32 29 23 1 243 
 
48. Some concerns were raised that registration costs could not be claimed given that ‘so much 
of our time was taken processing registrations’ and that the ‘administration of postal and 
proxy voting applications is not something for which a claim can be made, because it is 
classed as a "registration expense."’   
49. The sufficiency of levels of funding across local authorities is much more mixed, however.  It 
is alarming that 43 per cent disagreed or strongly disagreed that they had funding available 
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to support the work required to compile the electoral register.12 As one CO described in the 
survey: ‘there is not enough money provided to support the work on the electoral register’.  
Interviews with RCOs also suggested that while many areas were sufficiently funded others 
faced serious problems.  As one put it:  
‘We had some serious concerns about whether all COs in the [region] had enough 
resources.  In some councils it felt like a shoe string operation.’   
50. Cuts within local authority budgets appear to be one cause of the problem.  As one 
respondent put it: ‘Local Authority budgets are severely squeezed and while historically 
authorities have "subsidized" elections, this is becoming more difficult or impossible.’  
However, another is the introduction of individual electoral registration, which was 
commonly described as more expensive to implement. One CO described how the ‘funding 
massively underestimates the scale of the task at in hand in IER.’  Cuts in Cabinet Office 
funding were also cited. 
51. There were also some concerns about a lack of transparency and understanding of how and 
what the calculations for distributing funding were.  Several COs said they do not know why 
they get what they get.13 One CO said their allocation was £12,000 less than the previous 
electoral event and he did not know why. He thought this was based on historical precedent 
but factors like increases in postal costs and rental fees for polling stations are not taken into 
consideration.  Many COs expressed concerns about the funds available to pay poll staff. 
Experience with agents and campaigners 
52. Roughly half of COs reported no problems with agents and campaigners in the survey (Table 
8). 
53. One problem experienced with the appointment process was late, incomplete or incorrect 
applications from local agents.  Some agents were described as having little knowledge of 
the process.   
54. A common problem was that agents and campaigners were often inexperienced in their role 
since they were not necessarily part of a political party campaigning at elections.  To quote 
COs:  
                                                          
12
 On the importance of funding for maintaining and improving election quality and particularly the 
effectiveness of funding for electoral registration activities, see: Clark, A. (2014) ‘Investing in Electoral 
Management’ in P. Norris, R. Frank & F. Martinez I Coma (eds.) Advancing Electoral Integrity, New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp165-188 and also Clark, A. (2016) ‘Identifying the Determinants of Electoral Integrity and 
Administration in Advanced Democracies: The Case of Britain’, European Political Science Review, 
dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755773916000060. On rising costs in British electoral administration and reduced 
funding, also see: James, T.S. (2014) ‘Electoral Management in Britain’ in P. Norris, R. Frank & F. Martinez I 
Coma (eds.) Advancing Electoral Integrity, New York: Oxford University Press, pp 135-164 and James, T.S. 
(2014) ‘The Spill-over and Displacement Effects of Implementing Election Administration Reforms: Introducing 
Individual Electoral Registration in Britain’, Parliamentary Affairs, 67 (2): 281-305.  
   
13
 The allowance given to Counting Officers for expenses incurred in the administration of the referendum, 
known as the Maximum Recoverable Amount, was set out in the relevant charges order (The Referendum on 
the UK’s membership of the European Union (Counting Officers’ and Regional Counting Officers’ Charges 
Regulations 2016) for the poll. This amount is set by Government following consultation with Counting Officers 
which includes them providing a detailed estimate of the likely costs of the poll. This is in line with all other 
electoral events.   
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‘Most of the Campaigners were 'new' to this and weren't fully understanding of what was 
required of them and needed explaining.’ 
‘The appointed agents, particularly at a local level (when not from a usually engaged 
political party) showed a lack of understanding of basic electoral processes.’   
55. Some problems with agents and campaigners were experienced on polling day (see: ‘polling 
day’) and there was occasionally some uncertainty at counts as to who the agents were (see 
‘count’). 
Table 8: Agents (%) 
 No 
problems 
0 
1 2 3 4 Extensive 
problems 
5 
N 
Appointment of 
agents 
47 16 12 19 5 - 252 
Access to the 
electoral register 
55 20 8 12 5 - 250 
  
Absent voting 
56. There were significant problems faced with the volume of applications for postal and proxy 
votes with over half of respondents suggesting they had extensive challenges in this area 
(ranking this as either 4 or 5 in Table 9).  One local authority spoke of an ‘over 30% increase 
in postal [vote applications] between May and June… [and an] …over 150% increase in 
proxies’.  This quote was typical: 
‘The sheer volume and timing of postal and proxy vote applications was a big challenge 
for the electoral services team (time consuming to process) especially in the week before 
the poll.’ 
Table 9: Absent voting (%) 
 Not 
applicable 
No 
challenges 
whatsoev
er 
0 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
Extensive 
Challenges 
 
5 
N 
Postal vote dispatch 
timings (domestic)   
- 28 23 14 18 12 6 252 
Postal vote dispatch 
timings (overseas)   
- 28 22 12 17 13 8 251 
Issuing postal vote 
rejection notices for 
May  
1 26 25 14 18 12 4 250 
Printing  - 41 29 11 12 6 2 252 
Volume of applications 
for postal/proxy votes  
1 7 8 10 21 21 32 249 
Postal vote fraud  15 69 13 3 1 - - 253 
Other (please specify) 44 19 2 3 3 16 11 88 
 
57. The dispatch timings were also flagged as a problem in the survey (Table 9) and the 
qualitative comments. Many respondents understood the case for sending postal votes out 
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earlier however some reported that it led to more cancellations and a cross over with postal 
voting rejection notices.  For example, one CO suggested that:  
 
Issuing postal votes before the deadline for amendment has passed causes significant 
logistical and administration difficulties. E.g. where an elector re-registers after the 
original PV was issued 
 
58. COs commonly reported a public misunderstanding of the process.  There was confusion 
over whether the extension to the registration deadline applied to postal votes, whether 
postal votes could be submitted at polling stations, the use of proxies and a variety of other 
issues. 
59. Problems with overseas postal votes were reported too.  There were concerns that the 
application date for overseas registration was too late for postal votes to be issued.  As one 
CO put it:  
 
‘Postal vote applications were received from Overseas Voters after the 23 May dispatch 
date to overseas addresses, resulting in their overseas packs not being dispatched until 10 
June.  Applicants [were] not happy when their postal pack was being sent to Australia as 
they did not have enough time to return their postal vote before 23 June’  
 
In one illustrative example an electoral official received a complaint from a citizen in Canada 
who received their postal ballot on 23 June.  
60. Further contributory problems with overseas postal votes included anecdotal evidence that 
the international mail license was not being recognised by some post office staff in countries 
including Spain and Belgium.    Voters were reportedly advised that the licence was not valid 
and they would have to pay the return postage before the item was accepted.  It was also 
reported that the size of the return envelope most COs use (C5 or C5+) was sometimes not 
being considered an acceptable size in Germany.  If completed packs were simply placed in 
post boxes some were removed from the mailing system and not returned.  One RCO 
suggested that the system of overseas voting was ‘broken’ and needed to be replaced by 
another system e.g. internet voting to ensure confidence that votes could be cast and 
returned.  The absence of common postal practices and standards across the EU, let alone 
the rest of the world, therefore poses a real challenge for the delivery of overseas ballots. 
61. There was virtually no evidence of postal vote fraud.  As one respondent put it:  
 
[We] are one of the 17 high risk areas for integrity.  This referendum did not have any 
issues with integrity.’   
 
The extent to which problems were reported, it seems as if error may have been the cause.  
In one case a referendum agent reported a number of routine signature mismatches to the 
Police as fraudulent – but the electoral official suspected that this was just due to a 
misunderstanding of the adjudication process. 
62. Concerns were raised about the proxy voting system with many officials reporting a rise in 
the numbers.  As one put it: 
‘Emergency proxies are now becoming the norm and are open to abuse. I am sure whilst 
some are quite genuine, most are just people who suddenly realise that they have missed 
the deadline and see this as the only way they can now get around it. It should not be so 
widely advertised on the Commissions website as an alternative. People just download a 
form and email it in and we have to take it at face value, it’s too easy for them!’ 
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Some COs encountered would-be voters who could not attend the polls because of the need 
to attend funerals, which the proxy voting procedure did not cover. 
Polling day 
63. Interviews with RCOs and COs suggested that polling day broadly went smoothly across the 
UK.  The survey (Table 10) also illustrates that in most areas electoral officials experienced 
relatively few problems.  RCOs described those that were faced as ‘nothing unusual.’  This 
suggests that the planning for the referendum by the CCO, RCO and COs was of high quality.  
Those problems that were experienced were largely not the result of any action or inaction 
by the CCO but come from underlying issues with the electoral machinery. 
Table 10: Polling day problems (%) 
 No 
problems 
at all  
0 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
Extensive 
problems 
 
5 
N 
1.  Polling station staff recruitment  8 13 24 25 26 4 254 
2.  
 
People asking to vote, who were not on 
the electoral register 
3 32 30 23 11 2 254 
3.  Suspected cases of impersonation  76 18 2 3 1 - 253 
4.  
 
Suspected cases of electoral fraud  88 11 - 1 - - 254 
5.  
 
People taking photos of ballots/polling  
Stations 
68 24 4 3 - - 253 
6.  
 
 
Campaign groups behaving in an  
inappropriate or intimidating manner  
at polling stations 
63 20 8 5 3 1 253 
7.  
 
Voters not understanding how to vote   53 26 12 6 2 2 254 
8.  
 
Polling stations not opening on time  96 3 - - - - 253 
9.  Queues during the day at polling  
Stations 
52 25 16 6 1 - 254 
10.  Queues at the close of poll  87 9 3 1 - - 252 
11.  Other  81 3 3 5 6 2 87 
 
64. The most widely cited challenge cited by COs (in the survey and interviews) was the 
recruitment of staff, with only 8 per cent of COs reporting no problems at all.  The timing of 
the referendum in June (which is a common holiday period) and close proximity to the May 
elections (which had meant that staff had not taken holidays earlier) were factors.  One 
respondent suggested that ‘staff fatigue was high’.  The coinciding of the referendum with 
Ramadan, which will likely have been more important in areas with high Muslim 
populations, and the directions from the CCO to have a minimal number of staff in each 
polling station were also cited as contributing towards this.14 
                                                          
14
 Research has established a link between concurrent electoral events being held at the same time and lower 
levels of election quality. The link between the closeness of the May elections and the EU Referendum, and the 
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65. There was evidence of individuals turning up at polling stations but not being on the register.  
Only 3 per cent of respondents reported no problems.  A similar problem was reported at 
the 2015 general election, suggesting that this is not an uncommon problem in UK 
elections.15  Qualitative interview with RCOs suggested that the numbers were relatively low.  
However, comments from COs suggested that the numbers could be high in places, and 
there was evidence that some of these were citizens that had been removed from the 
electoral register in December 2015 as a result of the introduction of individual electoral 
register in December 2015.  According to one official: 
‘The majority of people who were unable to vote were those that were UNCONFIRMED 
electors at the Parliamentary election last year and had managed to vote then so could 
not understand why not now.’   
There was evidence of low understanding of the electoral registration process amongst 
citizens with some thinking that they were registered because they paid Council Tax.  As one 
official suggested: 
We had a number of people who were not registered and who thought that paying 
Council Tax meant that they were registered… considering the amount of voters, it was 
unnerving to see how many people did not know the process. 
66. There was some evidence of inappropriate behaviour or intimidation at polling stations by 
campaigners in the survey, with a third of respondents suggesting that there was a challenge 
of some degree (Table 10).  Qualitative comments described how this could include 
displaying campaign posters, or handing out leaflets close to polling stations. It is important 
to note that this is often a matter of differences in perception, with what campaigners may 
see as legitimate campaign efforts seen differently by voters. Yet, in some instances cars 
were parked outside polling stations containing the campaign material. One CO said that 
they had ‘several instances of tellers having to be moved on due to their intimidation of the 
electorate.’  In another counting area: 
We had one incident where a supporter of the exit campaign parked a car and the 
individual used a speaker to hail abuse at voters entering one polling station at [Location 
given]. Due to the attitude of the individual campaigning for exit Polling staff were 
advised to ring the Police but the incident passed before the Police arrived and it was not 
repeated. 
Some COs reported, however, that the actions were often ‘”new” [campaigners] and were 
not familiar with the 'do's and don'ts'.’    
67. When the affiliation of the agents involved in problems was cited by COs, they were all 
identified as leave campaigners.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
likely knock on effects on electoral administrators was noted prior to the referendum. See: Clark, A. (2016) 
‘Identifying the Determinants of Electoral Integrity and Administration in Advanced Democracies: The Case of 
Britain’, European Political Science Review, dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755773916000060 and  Clark, A. (2016) 
Electoral Administration & the EU Referendum, Political Studies Association Blog, 10 June, 
https://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/electoral-administration-and-eu-referendum    
15
 Alistair Clark and Toby S. James (forthcoming) ‘Poll Workers, Surveys and Bureaucratic Accountability’, in P. 
Norris & A. Nai (eds.) (2016) Election Watchdogs: Transparency, Accountability and Integrity Oxford University 
Press. 
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68. There were very few suspected cases of electoral fraud and few suspicions of personation 
(Table 10).  Qualitative findings suggested that where concerns were held they were about 
individual voters rather than widespread cases. 
69. The few suspected cases of fraud are in stark contrast to the concerns about electoral fraud 
raised by campaigners. The hashtag #pengate was widely circulated on social media 
encouraging voters to take pens to the polling station rather than pencils because their 
votes could be rubbed out and changed by electoral officials. Responses to the survey 
suggested that this caused some problems on polling day. Some authorities suggested that 
this created number of considerable queries in the polling station and telephone calls. Some 
voters ‘insist[ed] that the Council would rub out their marks on the ballot paper when we 
emptied the ballot boxes at the count’.  Pens were thrown at polling staff in one instance. 
70. Flash flooding created some problems on the day of the poll.  In a very limited number of 
cases it affected polling by, for example, causing traffic problems which delayed staff from 
reaching and opening the polling station, or, causing a polling station to be relocated during 
the course of the day.  Problems seem to have been dealt with quickly and there was no 
evidence of any significant impact on access to the polling station. 
71. There was some evidence of queues during the day, but very little at the close of the poll.  
Qualitative comments suggested that the queues were ‘not unmanageable’. 
72. Electoral Management Software problems also occurred in an isolated number of cases. 
Verification and count 
73. On the night of the referendum, the counts went overwhelmingly smoothly. 93 per cent 
agreed or strongly agreed that the ‘count collation process worked well’. 
74. The count rehearsals were also seen as being especially effective at ironing out potential 
problems. Although initial problems were identified with the software and many 
respondents suggested that an additional rehearsal should have been held to reassure that 
the systems had been rectified.   Some respondents were unhappy that the rehearsal was 
held late at night since it ‘additional burden on my [staff] at a time when she was already 
worn out and had already worked a long day’. 
Table 11: Count night problems (%) 
 N/A No challenges 
whatsoever 
0 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
Extensive 
Challeng
es 
 
5 
N 
The venues used for the 
count  
1 75 13 5 4 2 1 254 
Count staff recruitment   - 35 24 20 14 6 2 254 
Resources for the count  - 64 19 9 5 2 - 252 
Campaigners behaving in 
an inappropriate or 
intimidating manner at the 
count 
3 75 15 3 2 1 1 253 
The timing of the count 
process 
- 65 15 10 5 4 1 254 
21 
 
The verification process   - 78 17 4 1 - - 254 
The counting method  - 83 12 4 1 - - 254 
Contacting the RCO  2 81 12 4 - 1 - 253 
Contacting the CCO/DCCO  53 41 4 2 - - - 250 
Other 67 32 - 2 - - - 63 
75. The implementation of the mini count system was a challenge for some COs16. One CO noted 
that being directed to implement a new counting structure in such a high profile electoral 
event was risky. Others said that they operated the counting system they were familiar with 
so there was less training involved and lower risk of error. 
76. Some RCOs and COs had to deal with Counting agents who were inexperienced and 
unfamiliar with the counting process because they had not been involved in elections 
before.  This led to some uncertainty as to who to approach on the night. 
77. Counting staff recruitment was an issue in some areas because of the lateness of the count, 
and other factors such as the date of the referendum.  
78. Other challenges on the night included dealing with floods which delayed the declaration in 
a very small number of areas.  In one Welsh counting area there was a problem with an 
incorrect translation of the result announcement into Welsh which caused a delay. 
Electoral integrity 
79. Police Single Points of Contact (SPoCs) were less important than might have been the case 
on the day of the referendum because of the low level of problems. 
80. COs were generally very clear how to report suspicions of electoral fraud and found their 
SPoC accessible and responsive.  As one CO put it: ‘Police officers were in attendance at all 
polling places around the borough from 7am-10:30pm. Excellent partnership working with 
our local Police force.’  
81. There were some exceptions, however.  By way of illustrative examples, some COs 
suggested: 
‘The SPOC was on sick leave and his replacement was not confirmed so it was not until 
lunch time that I was able to make contact. 
‘One incident where we were unable to contact SPOC and an incident was reported via 
101.’ 
Table 12: Electoral Integrity Reporting (%) 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
N 
It was clear to me how I should 
report suspicions of electoral fraud 
- 2 7 60 31 253 
                                                          
16
 The direction about method of verification and count was that “COs ensure verification and counting 
arrangements are structured in such a way as to break down the verification and count into a number of self-
contained ‘areas’ smaller than the voting area, with the totals for each of these ‘areas’ aggregated into a single 
total for the voting area.” These ‘smaller areas’ were not defined by the CCO and left to the discretion of the 
COs. 
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The Police Single Point of Contact 
(SPoC) was accessible when needed 
3 4 21 45 28 253 
The Police Single Point of Contact 
(SPoC) was responsive when needed 
2 4 30 37 27 253 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
82. The EU Referendum on 23rd June 2016 was generally well managed by the CCO and electoral 
officials with few problems or incidents on the day of the poll and during the counting 
process.  There were very few problems with electoral fraud and voter intimidation, despite 
high profile concerns in advance of the referendum and on the day of the poll which were 
widely spread across social media.17  
83. With regard to intimidation, concerns clearly exist, even if levels are low. The experience of 
the referendum may point to difficulties ahead with the large influx of new and 
inexperienced members and campaigners in a number of political parties. Even if non-
statutory, The Electoral Commission’s Code of Conduct for Campaigners should continue to 
be circulated to referendum and election campaigners, candidates and their agents prior to 
elections. A copy should ,continue to be provided to all polling stations to help deal with 
campaigners who may be perceived to overstep what is desirable.    
84. Figure 2 illustrates the overall level of satisfaction about the quality of electoral 
administration amongst COs. 
Figure 2: Satisfaction with Local Electoral Administration (%)
 
                                                          
17
 See for a summary: Clark, A. (2016) Electoral Administration & the EU Referendum, Political Studies 
Association Blog, 10 June, https://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/electoral-administration-and-eu-
referendum  
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85. A better balance seems to have been found with the use of directions at referendums.  The 
management structures seemed to work better than in the AV referendum suggesting some 
learning from past practices and ‘bedding in’ of new processes.  
86. There are underlying problems with electoral registration. There was widespread public 
confusion about the electoral registration process and a large number of duplicate 
applications which absorbed resources.   A system to allow citizens to check their 
registration status online would reduce duplicate registration applications and allow public 
engagement to increase new registrations.  A change to election-day registration, or a closer 
registration deadline to the day of the poll, would not be possible without significant 
investment in resources and staffing or overall review of business processes.  This report has 
identified further evidence that some citizens are turned away from polling stations thinking 
that they are registered but having found that they are not.  There is a strong case for using 
other public records to automate parts of the electoral registration process. It is very 
concerning that there is evidence of real electors being removed from the December 2015 
electoral register for being unconfirmed under the transition to individual electoral 
registration and being unable to vote at the referendum. 
87. A common theme throughout the survey was concerns about workplace pressure, stress and 
staffing.  This is especially the case when electoral events follow each other in quick 
succession making taking holidays difficult.  There was evidence of problems with 
recruitment in polling stations, the count but also the core parts of electoral teams.  This 
should be monitored on a regular basis through workforce surveys.18 A wider debate on the 
merits and demerits of holding electoral events concurrently or in close proximity, as is often 
now the practice, and their effect on the quality of elections needs to take place between all 
relevant stakeholders and electors.19 
88. Alarmingly, concerns about levels of funding were raised with nearly half of local authorities 
claiming that they have insufficient funds to maintain the electoral register. A general 
debate about funding registration and electoral services is overdue given the financial 
pressures most local authorities are under.    
89. Absent voting has become increasingly popular in Britain and was so again in the 
referendum.  Multi-channel elections are an important part of the electoral machinery.  
There are, however, some challenging business processes involved in postal voting and 
overseas voting which also place a strain on local authorities and may have left some citizens 
unable to vote or their vote not being included in the count.  There may be a case for 
considering alternative voting and registration methods for overseas citizens, such as online 
voting, especially given the governments concern to extend the franchise for overseas voters 
boost overseas registrations. 
90. This is the most detailed post-electoral event survey of its type in the UK.  The survey could 
be used as a template for future electoral events to enable systematic comparison and 
identify trends over time.  This would allow the effects of reforms to be analysed.  
                                                          
18
 Also see evidence of a high proportion of staff stating that they had considered quitting their post in the last 
12 months, reported in: James, T.S. & Bite the Ballot (2016) Getting the missing millions back on the electoral 
register, All Party Parliamentary Group on Voter Registration: London. 
19
 Clark, A. (2016) ‘Identifying the Determinants of Electoral Integrity and Administration in Advanced 
Democracies: The Case of Britain’, European Political Science Review, dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755773916000060 
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